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Introduction

Wednesday, November 30, 2011

Introduction

America's container ports play an important role in handling U.S. merchandise trade moving to and from distant places around the world. Each year, these seaports handle exports produced at U.S. factories and farms and imports of goods such as automobiles, machinery, electronics, apparel, shoes, toys, and food. American households depend on the nation's container seaports for everyday items, and American businesses depend on these seaports for facilitating the exchange of merchandise with trading partners around the world.

2008 was an exceptionally challenging year for the nation's container ports as TEU throughput dropped nationwide.

During 2008, the volume of maritime freight handled by America's container ports dropped. U.S. international merchandise trade transported by maritime container vessels fell sharply toward the end of the year, a decline that continued into 2009. Total U.S. containerized freight for December 2008 was down 18 percent compared with December 2007 (table 1). Maritime containerized imports declined 15 percent, and exports fell by 21 percent (JOC PIERS 2009a). This happened as U.S. businesses cut inventories, manufacturing and construction activities stalled, and Americans cut back on spending as unemployment rose, home values fell, and investment portfolios shrank.

The year 2008 was exceptionally challenging for the nation's leading container seaports. After a steady pace at the beginning of the year, by end of 2008, containerized freight throughput declined for each of the leading ports in the Pacific/west coast, Atlantic/east coast, and gulf coast regions (table 1). All the major ports saw a decline in December 2008 compared with the same month in the previous year. The nation's two leading container ports, Los Angeles and Long Beach, experienced 13 and 25 percent year-on-year drops, respectively. Other leading ports saw worse declines in container traffic, with cargo falling by more than one-third to almost one-half-for example, Seattle fell 38 percent and Mobile fell 49 percent.

By the end of 2008, U.S. total maritime container traffic at all U.S. ports was estimated at 28.2 million TEUs (see box), a 3 percent drop from the 29 million TEUs in 2007 (table 1). During 2008, west coast ports had a 5 percent decline in container traffic and gulf coast ports had a 3 percent decline. East coast ports had a 0.2 percent, or essentially negligible, increase. Among the nation's top 10 leading container ports, 7 saw declines in their container cargo throughput in 2008. The two largest declines were Seattle at 16 percent and Long Beach at 8 percent (table 1 and figure 1). Only 3 of the top 10 ports, all on the east coast, handled slightly more container cargo in 2008 than in 2007-Savannah grew by 3.6 percent, New York/New Jersey by 1.4 percent, and Norfolk by 1.2 percent. These east coast ports tend to have a more diversified trade market with Europe, Asia, Latin America, and South America, unlike the west coast ports, which trade almost exclusively with the Asia-Pacific market.

TEU Defined:

The standard measure for counting containers is the 20-foot equivalent unit, or TEU. This measure is used to count containers of various lengths. A standard 40-foot container is 2 TEUs, and a 48-foot container equals 2.4 TEUs. It is also used to describe the capacities of containerships or ports.

Containerized trade between the United States and the rest of the world fell in 2008 because of the combined influence of weak domestic consumer demand, which cut import levels, and the global economic slowdown, which cut foreign demand for U.S. exports. During the second half of 2008, as the U.S. financial crisis began to directly impact consumer spending, Americans cut back on their purchase of imported clothes, automobiles, and other consumer merchandise, such as toys and flat-panel televisions. In addition, as the domestic financial crisis deepened and the global recession widened, overseas trading partners' demand for U.S. goods started to tumble, further weakening the maritime container market. As a result, declines occurred in U.S. demand for maritime container transportation by ocean vessels, cargo-handling activity at the container ports, and the volume of intermodal freight moved to and from the ports by truck and rail.

The declines in maritime container traffic mirrored the slide in overall U.S. international merchandise exports and imports transported by all modes of transportation in 2007 and 2008 and followed the trend in the national economy as a whole (figure 2 and figure 3). According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the primary contributors to the declines in merchandise exports and imports in the fourth quarter of 2008 were industrial supplies and materials; automotive vehicles, parts, and engines; consumer goods; and foods, feeds, and beverages (USDOC CB BEA 2009). When adjusted for inflation, the value of merchandise exports in the fourth quarter of 2008 dropped 34 percent compared with that of the third quarter. The value of merchandise imports dropped 19 percent (figure 3).

Trends in container shipping are directly related to patterns in overall international trade, which is a primary contributing factor in the nation's economic growth. For example, real gross domestic product (GDP)-the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States-decreased at an annual rate of 6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 (i.e., from the third quarter to the fourth quarter). In the third quarter, real GDP decreased 0.5 percent (USDOC BEA 2009). The slowdown in real GDP primarily refl ected a sharp decline in personal consumption expenditure, the downturn in exports and imports, and a decline in state and local government spending.

Declines in economic activity and drops in exports and imports result in reduced demand for freight transportation services by all modes of transportation. However, because the majority of U.S. overseas merchandise trade (over 66 percent by value and 99 percent by weight) moves by ocean vessel (USDOC CB 2009), the nation's container ports felt the crunch immediately, but the effects were not limited to the seaports. 1

EFFECTS OF DROP IN CONTAINER THROUGHPUT

The consequences of the 2008 decline in container throughput at the nation's seaports reached beyond marine ports and terminals, affecting containership fleet capacity, railroads and commercial trucks that service the seaports, and the inland warehouses and distribution centers that provide logistical support for the entire multimodal freight supply chain. First, because of the decline in global demand for containership services, the estimated number of container vessels idled at seaports worldwide soared by March 2009 to a record high of more than 450 ships with a carrying capacity of 1.4 million TEUs (AXS-Alphaliner 2009). These idle container vessels accounted for approximately 11 percent of the world containership fleet. The capacity of idle container vessels worldwide nearly tripled from the beginning of 2008, when it was estimated to be about 210 ships and 550,000 TEUs.

Second, with the overall decline in containerized exports and imports, the number of intermodal 2 shipping containers and truck trailers transported nationwide on railcars by the nation's Class I railroads 3 in 2008 was 11.5 million units, down 4 percent from 12 million in 2007 and from a record high of 12.3 million in 2006. About 60 percent of rail intermodal traffic consists of merchandise imports and exports (AAR 2009). In 2008, the number of international intermodal containers moved by rail from the seaports totaled 7.8 million, a decrease of 7 percent from 2007 (Intermodal Association of North America 2008). The imports arrive on ocean vessels and are long-hauled by railcars to destinations across the county, and the exports originate all across the nation and are headed for destinations around the world.

In one example of the severity of the declines, the leading Class I railroad for handling intermodal shipments from west coast ports, Union Pacific (UP), reported that the major economic downturn during the fourth quarter of 2008 compounded already declining intermodal volumes experienced earlier in the year and resulted in fewer intermodal shipments (Union Pacific Corp. 2009). UP's intermodal traffic from west coast intermodal terminals was 1.5 million container units in 2008, down 7 percent from 1.6 million units in 2007. In particular, at the Intermodal Container Transfer Facility in Los Angeles, UP's intermodal traffic dropped 13 percent during the same period.

There were similar declines in trucking services in the second half of 2008, resulting in record lows for overall freight trucking activity. In December 2008, according to the American Trucking Association (ATA), trucking activity nationwide was down 13 percent from December 2007. Trucking services declined for 6 consecutive months, from June through December 2008 (ATA 2009).

Nationwide freight activity for all modes, measured by the Freight Transportation Services Index (TSI), declined 3.0 percent in 2008. According to the TSI, this decline was the third consecutive annual decline and the largest since 2000 (USDOT RITA BTS 2009). The freight TSI measures changes in the output of services provided by the for-hire freight transportation industries and consists of data from for-hire trucking, rail, inland waterways, pipelines, and air freight.

Globally, 1 maritime container in every 10 is bound to or originates in the United States.

Third, the slowdown of economic activity within the United States, the reduction in consumer spending on foreign goods, and the decline in demand for freight transportation services resulted in excess inventory for certain imported products moved by ocean vessels, especially foreign automobiles. By March 2009, the parking lots of the nation's top auto ports had thousands of new car imports that could not be moved out. Auto dealers could not take delivery of them because of the drop in consumer demand and the lack of bank credit to fi nance their inventories (Leach 2009). The Port of Baltimore, the top auto-handling port in the United States, had about 57,000 new cars at its terminals and the port had to store some at the nearby Baltimore- Washington International Marshall Airport (Dennis 2009). Storage of imported autos at U.S. seaports further reduces demand for train and truck services to transport them to dealerships, dampens the market for third-party logistics services, decreases overseas car manufacturing, and ultimately increases the number of ocean vessels that are idled.

TRENDS IN CONTAINER THROUGHPUT

Despite the 2008 decline in the nation's economic activity and international merchandise exports and imports, the United States remains the world's largest trading nation with the world's biggest economy. Today, 1 container in every 10 carrying global trade is bound for or originates in the United States, accounting for 10 percent of worldwide container traffic. In 2008, world maritime container traffic (loaded and empty) was estimated at over 387 million TEUs, down from 437 million TEUs transported in 2007 (table 2).

U.S. container traffic doubled over the past decade, and the growth trend is expected to continue.

Between 1995 and 2008, world container traffic more than tripled in volume from 137 million TEUs to 387 million TEUs, growing at an average annual rate of about 8 percent (table 2). This continued long-term growth in maritime container freight reflects sustained U.S. and global economic activity. During this same period, U.S. total container traffic more than doubled in volume from 22 million TEUs in 1995 to an estimated 45 million in 2007, falling to about 38 million in 2008. From 1995 to 2008, U.S. total TEUs rose at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent. The primary factors underlying the long-term growth in U.S. maritime container traffic are the proportion of merchandise trade transported in containers; rising trade with Asia- Pacific trading partners, particularly China; and the increasing importance of merchandise trade to U.S economic activity. Looking ahead, the volume of containers that U.S. seaports handle in the coming years will mainly be determined by how much the United States continues to rely on imported manufactured goods, which countries it trades with most, and what kinds of products it imports rather than produces domestically. Rising demand for foreign manufactured products would mean super-sized container vessels would carry such products to the nation's seaports, enabling continued growth in containerization. 4

The United States ranked second in container traffic in 2007, a position it has held since China took over the number one position in 1998. Nonetheless, the United States remains the leading trading nation, accounting for 11 percent of total world merchandise trade in 2007 (figure 4). U.S. total imports ranked first, accounting for over 14 percent of the global imports in 2007. U.S. total exports accounted for 8 percent of global exports, behind Germany, the leading exporter (WTO 2008). The United States also remained the world's largest economy, accounting for 23 percent of World GDP in 2008, down slightly from 25 percent in 1995 (table 2).

From 1995 to 2008, the volume of containerized cargo moving through U.S. seaports grew at a faster rate, 6 percent, than U.S. real GDP growth, 3 percent (figure 5). During most of the 1990s, strong growth of the U.S. economy, rising household wealth and income in the United States, and steady consumer demand at home spurred U.S. international goods trade, which resulted in greater demands for containerized freight transportation services.

BOX 1
Repositioning of Empty Containers

A broad challenge facing the U.S. maritime industry is the repositioning of empty containers after they have been emptied of the goods they transported to the United States. During the past 20 years, as merchandise trade between the United States and its trading partners-particularly Asia-Pacific Rim countries- mushroomed and the trade imbalance grew, the number of empty containers idling in the United States increased. In general, the larger the trade imbalance, the greater the need to reposition empty containers for shippers to use for exports.

Although containers are designed to be reused (with new cargo loaded for a new location soon after the original cargo is off-loaded), in many cases the cost of transporting an empty container to a place where it can be reloaded is higher than the container is worth, particularly when empty containers must be transported from inland locations to U.S. shippers or overseas.

In 1997, the difference between TEUs of U.S. containerized imports and exports was about 715,000. By 2006, the difference had reached a record high of nearly 10 million TEUs. In 2008, it was about 6 million TEUs. These large numbers illustrate the magnitude of the challenge of handling idle containers.

Empty containers are stored near seaports and inland intermodal transfer locations. Los Angeles, Long Beach, and New York/New Jersey are the three largest port markets where leasing companies and shipping lines store empty containers, and Chicago, Dallas, and Memphis are notable storage locations for empty containers inland (Mongelluzzo 2008). In 2008, the nation's top container port, the Port of Los Angeles, handled about 1.9 million TEUs of empty export containers, accounting for 51 percent of the total outbound export TEUs for the port.

A comparison of the year-on-year percent change between U.S.-loaded container TEUs and real GDP shows a correlation between the container maritime industry trends and general economic conditions (figure 6). This comparison shows the effect that economic cycles have on the U.S. container trade, as evidenced by the declines in TEUs during the 2001 and 2008 recessions. As figure 6 shows, the container trade trend is more volatile than the GDP trend. However, assuming that the strong cyclical relationship continues, when the U.S. economy recovers and the volume of merchandise imports and exports rebounds, then U.S. container seaports are likely to see a resurgence of container throughput at their terminals.

GATEWAYS FOR INBOUND AND OUTBOUND TRAFFIC

While America's container seaports serve as gateways for both merchandise imports and exports, overall they handle more TEUs of imports than exports. In 2008, the U.S. defi cit in maritime container traffic-the gap between exports and imports-narrowed to 6 million TEUs as maritime container imports fell 8 percent and exports grew 6 percent (figure 7). This marked the second year in a row that the deficit fell following record high imports in 2006. In 2007 and 2008, although the United States exported less abroad than it imported, imports declined steeply because of the economic slowdown at home. Exports grew at a modest pace.

Before 1998, the defi cit of U.S. international container traffic was less than 1 million TEUs per year, but by 2008, this gap had signifi cantly widened, with imports accounting for a larger share of the total container traffic (figure 7). In 2008, maritime container imports passing through U.S. seaports accounted for 61 percent of total container traffic, a sizeable increase from 51 percent in 1995. However, container exports handled by the ports seem to be rebounding, reaching 39 percent of total container traffic in 2008, an increase from a low of 33 percent in 2005. A likely factor for the surge in exports during 2007 and 2008 is the fall of the U.S. dollar relative to the European euro and other currencies. During this period, as the dollar fell against the euro, American goods became more affordable overseas. This contributed to the rise in maritime container exports. A stronger dollar provides Americans with greater purchasing power and results in more goods being imported, while a weaker dollar leads to foreign buyers purchasing more U.S. products. 5

Figure 8 shows the location of the nation's top 25 maritime container ports for U.S. international containerized exports and imports in 2008. The top three container port gateways were Los Angeles, Long Beach, and New York/New Jersey. The containerized exports and imports handled by these leading ports serve the international trade needs of every state, both coastal states with seaports as well as landlocked states that depend on seaports for their merchandise trade export and imports. The containerized cargo arrives and leaves the seaports either by rail or truck as single modes or by intermodal truck-rail combination.

Overall U.S. international maritime container traffic more than doubled between 1995 and 2008 (figure 9). In 2008, about 28 million TEUs of U.S. international oceanborne trade moved through U.S. container ports, up from 13 million in 1995 (JOC PIERS 2009b). As the rebound after the low year in 2001 suggests, long-term growth is likely to resume after the U.S. and global economies recover from the current worldwide economic downturn.

In 2008, U.S. container ports handled a daily average of 77,000 TEUs, up from 37,000 TEUs per day in 1995. This large number of containers moving through the nation's seaports highlights the significance of container traffic and its potential impacts on the economy, local communities, national security, and the natural environment. It also underscores the challenges of handling this cargo efficiently, alleviating highway congestion around the seaports, improving landside access to ports, and removing freight bottlenecks at intermodal transfer locations where trucks and railroads connect to marine terminals.

A major factor affecting landside access to U.S. container ports is the continuing growth of containerization. Growth in containerization is directly related to the provision of adequate intermodal capacity to handle the associated increase in the level of landside traffic. For example, on a typical day in 2008, container throughput for the New York/New Jersey port, the nation's third largest container port, was 5,265,053 TEUs (PANYNJ 2009). Assuming a typical line-haul truck 6 carries an equivalent of two TEUs, this annual throughput translates into 2,632,526 one-way truck trips per year. This is equivalent to 10,125 truck trips each weekday resulting from containerized cargo. At approximately 40 feet per trailer, on a typical work day the trailers would stretch about 77 miles if lined up end to end.

PORT CONCENTRATION

The geographic distribution of container activity among U.S. seaports shows a greater concentration of vessel calls and cargo traffic in a few leading ports because of increased demand for larger, faster, and more specialized vessels. Today, maxi-Panamax superfreighter vessels are much longer than two football fields and can carry up to 12,500 TEUs. 7

In 2008, the top 10 U.S. container ports accounted for 86 percent of containerized imports and exports (measured in TEUs), up from 78 percent in 1995. Five of the top 10 container ports in the United States are on the west coast, four are on the east coast, and one on the gulf coast (table 3).

From 1995 to 2008, Los Angeles and Long Beach grew the most in terms of absolute level of container traffic, reflecting increased U.S. trade with Pacific Rim 8 countries, particularly China, and the transportation of higher-value per ton Asian manufactured goods into the United States. New York followed closely, showing significant growth in U.S. trade with Europe. The ports of Savannah, Los Angeles, and Houston had the largest average annual growth rates (table 3). The growth rates for Savannah and Houston reflect the expansion in U.S. container trade with Latin American countries and changes in the location of freight logistics and distribution service centers.

Despite the national economic slowdown, container cargo handled by the Port of Savannah grew 4 percent in 2008 over 2007, the fastest growth among the leading container ports. Between 1995 and 2005, oceanborne containerized cargo handled there increased by 13 percent, making it the fastest growing port in the nation. This growth in Savannah's containerized traffic also underscores the increase in retail import distribution centers in the Savannah area-several national retailers have established large distribution centers there for handling the thousands of TEUs transiting the nation's seaports.

REGIONAL SHIFTS IN PORT MARKET SHARE

The increased use of oceanborne containers in transporting U.S. international trade continues to affect port operations and the distribution of total maritime trade among U.S. ports. Before the mid-1980s, when U.S. trade with Pacific Rim Asian countries was modest, east coast ports handled the majority of U.S. international maritime trade. As trade with Asia grew, the east coast ports' share of the value of trade declined and west coast ports' share increased (figure 10). Eventually, west coast ports surpassed east coast ports in maritime cargo handled, and this trend has continued to today. Also during this period, changes in industrial activity in the Midwest affected the volume and type of cargo moving through Great Lakes ports. For example, the relocation of final automobile assembly plants and companies that produce auto parts had an impact on manufacturing activities in the Midwest. With the emergence of automakers and parts producers in other parts of the United States, maritime cargo originating in the Midwest and cargo transport via the Great Lakes dwindled. Gulf of Mexico ports experienced a modest increase in their relative share as trade with Latin America grew.

Over half of U.S. containerized merchandise trade, measured in terms of TEUs, passes through west coast ports. In 2007, 55 percent of the containerized imports and exports passed through these ports, up from 42 percent in 1980 (figure 10). West coast ports as a region grew the fastest during this period (figure 11).

Although west coast ports handled the most container trade, they also had a larger share of the oceanborne containerized trade deficit, in terms of export-import balance, than other regional ports. Today, west coast ports serve more as import gateways to the United States than as export gateways to the rest of the world. In contrast, east coast ports handle more exports than imports, despite the decline in their regional market share.

Container trade also affects the pattern of freight movement within the United States. Nearly all U.S. oceanborne container trade is transported throughout the country by either rail carriers, long-haul truck carriers, or local truck carriers. Some ports use short-sea shipping as an alternative to transport goods shorter distances. 9 The availability and efficiency of intermodal transportation in moving these goods to and from any U.S. port increases shippers' choices of transportation modes and port facilities, allowing ports to effectively use their economies of scale to attract cargo from beyond their immediate region. The growth in U.S. containerized cargo shipping is placing pressure on the nation's transportation network and affects local traffic congestion and delays in the urban areas surrounding the major U.S. container ports. (See Spotlight 1 on landside access to the seaports.)

VESSEL CALLS AND CAPACITY

During the past two decades, the concentration of maritime container vessel calls at U.S. ports has shifted as the volume of containerized cargo handled by the ports has changed. In 2007, there were nearly 20,000 containership calls at U.S. seaports, accounting for 31 percent of the total oceangoing vessel calls made by all vessel types at U.S. ports. 10 The top five container ports handled over half (57 percent) of these container vessel calls and 63 percent of the container cargo capacity (table 4). Just 2 years before, in 2005, the top five ports handled 55 percent of the calls and 61 percent of the capacity.

Between 2002 and 2007, the number of vessel calls at U.S. container ports rose 16 percent, from about 17,100 to 19,800 calls. By contrast, total vessel calls grew by 13 percent, from 56,600 to 63,800 calls.

Measured by the average vessel size per call, U.S. maritime ports also handled larger container vessels than in the past. The average size (per call) of container vessels calling at U.S. ports was nearly 48,000 deadweight tons (dwt) in 2007 (table 4). This is a significant increase from 38,000 dwt in 2000. Increases in vessel calls and containership capacity affect port operation, port productivity, and infrastructure requirements needed to accommodate the mega post-Panamax vessels. They also affect environmental considerations and community-impact issues. (See Spotlight 3 on ports and environmental concerns.)

RANKING OF U.S. PORTS AMONG WORLD’S TOP PORTS

In 2008, only 3 U.S. ports-Los Angeles, Long Beach, and New York/New Jersey-ranked among the world's top 20 container ports when measured by TEUs, placing 16th, 17th, and 20th, respectively (table 5). Since 2000, these 3 U.S. ports have dropped in the ranking of the world's top 20 ports as European and Southeast Asian ports handled more containerized cargo. During the same period, Chinese seaports became more dominant, and today 6 of the top 10 world ports are in China. Figure 12 shows the locations of the top 20 world container ports in 2008, the 2008 ranking by TEUs of cargo handled, and the cargo increases since 2000.

TRADING PARTNERS

While the United States exports and imports maritime goods from more than 175 countries, the vast majority of the trade is with relatively few countries. In 2007, nearly three-quarters (72 percent) of the container import TEUs were with 10 countries, and over half (55 percent) of the container export TEUs were with 10 countries. The top five overall U.S. containerized cargo trading partners in 2007 were all Asian countries: China (mainland), 11 Japan, Hong Kong (China), South Korea, and Taiwan. China (mainland) was the leading containerized merchandise trading partner, accounting for 47 percent of U.S. maritime import TEUs, up from 25 percent in 2000. China accounted for 18 percent of the export TEUs in 2007, down slightly from 2005 (figure 13 and figure 14).

Between 2000 and 2007, while China's share grew of total U.S. container trade, the other top five trading partners saw declines in their total maritime containerized cargo with the United States. Japan is now the second largest trading partner for U.S. oceanborne containerized exports, having been overtaken by China in 2003. In 2007, the U.S. maritime container imports from China alone were larger than those from more than 170 countries combined (i.e., those countries grouped into "other" (figure 13)).

U.S. imports and exports with major trading partners vary by types of goods, and this affects the types of vessels (for example, container, dry bulk, general cargo, or tanker), number of port calls, and the seaports the vessels use. For instance, while most U.S.-Canada maritime trade involves agricultural products, lumber, and petroleum products, most U.S.-Germany maritime trade involves manufactured products such as automobiles and machinery. In addition, U.S. maritime imports from Japan were valued at over $7,000 per ton, but U.S. exports to Japan were valued at $800 per ton, reflecting differences in the types of goods and the growth in high-value containerized imports to U.S. ports. Major U.S. maritime imports from Japan include passenger cars, car parts, and electronic equipment, and major U.S. maritime exports to Japan include agricultural products, industrial machinery, and chemicals.

ENTRIES OF OCEANBORNE CONTAINER UNITS

The container entries data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) represented in this section and the next and in figure 15 and figure 16 are different from the TEU data presented earlier in the report. The CBP entries data count individual container units, while the TEU data refer to 20-foot equivalent units (that is, one 20-foot container equals one TEU, and one 40-foot container equals two TEUs). Because containers come in different lengths (for example, 20 feet, 40 feet, and 48 feet), the CBP figures on individual units differ from the TEU figures, which convert the tonnage of goods moved in the containers into TEUs.

The challenge of handling large volumes of containerized imports from U.S. trading partners can also be seen in the number of individual container entries processed by CBP. After a slight decline in the number of oceanborne containers entering the United States in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the nation's seaports again began handling an increasing number of container units. In 2007, there were about 12 million oceanborne container entries into the United States, down slightly from 2006 but still double those of 2000 (figure 15). Maritime container entries peak in the summer months, when imported merchandise trade is delivered for the fall and holiday seasons (figure 16).

CONTAINER ENTRIES BY ALL MODES FROM ALL COUNTRIES

On a typical day in 2007, more than 70,000 individual container units entered the United States by ocean vessel, truck, and rail. In 2000, the figure was about 50,000 units per day.

Overall, there were over 25 million container entries into the United States by all modes of transportation in 2007, up 38 percent from nearly 19 million in 2000. In addition to the more than 11 million oceanborne containers used to bring goods into the United States, over 14 million containers entered the nation by truck and rail from Canada and Mexico in 2007 (table 6). The large number of containers crossing by land border into the United States by surface modes reflects the importance of U.S. trade with two of our top three trading partners. From 2000 to 2007, the number of truck, rail, and maritime container units (loaded and unloaded) crossing into the United States rose by 8 percent, 27 percent, and 94 percent, respectively.

1 Based on data from Clarkson Research Services Ltd., Container Intelligence Monthly, Vol. 8, No. 10, London, UK.

2 Based on data from World Trade Organization, 2006 Trade Report.

1 Based on data from Clarkson Research Services Ltd., Container Intelligence Monthly, Vol. 8, No. 10, London, UK.

2 Based on data from World Trade Organization, 2006 Trade Report.

1 Based on data from Clarkson Research Services Ltd., Container Intelligence Monthly, Vol. 8, No. 10, London, UK.

2 Based on data from World Trade Organization, 2006 Trade Report.

1 Based on data from Clarkson Research Services Ltd., Container Intelligence Monthly, Vol. 8, No. 10, London, UK.

2 Based on data from World Trade Organization, 2006 Trade Report.

1 Based on data from Clarkson Research Services Ltd., Container Intelligence Monthly, Vol. 8, No. 10, London, UK.

2 Based on data from World Trade Organization, 2006 Trade Report.

1 Based on data from Clarkson Research Services Ltd., Container Intelligence Monthly, Vol. 8, No. 10, London, UK.